This paper develops a macroeconomic model in which funds are channeled to entrepreneurs through long-term relationships between entrepreneurs and lenders. The flow of funds to a relationship may be low, causing it to break up due to insufficient liquidity. Multiple Pareto ranked steady states emerge from complementarity between financial intermediation, reflected by the number of relationships, and households' incentives to provide funds. This complementarity also serves as a mechanism for propagating aggregate shocks. Financial collapse may become inescapable if a shock destroys sufficiently many relationships.
Introduction
The standard credit-market paradigm in macroeconomics presumes that firms borrow on frictionless spot markets from anonymous lenders. An important body of evidence has shown, however, that credit-market trading often takes place within long-term relationships between borrowers and lenders; further, these relationships operate with frictions. 1 In this paper, we demonstrate the important role that such frictions play in sustaining low-activity steady states and propagating aggregate shocks.
We develop a dynamic equilibrium model in which funds are channeled to entrepreneurs through long-term relationships with lenders. Our model identifies three frictions that affect this flow. First, there is a matching friction in the market to establish entrepreneur-lender relationships. This friction highlights the importance of long-term relationships, because an entrepreneur who is separated from his current lender must engage in time-consuming search to find another source of funds. Second, our model specifies an allocation friction in the distribution of funds to lenders.
We assume that random shocks affect the amount of funds available in a relationship, and that it is costly for lenders to obtain additional funds on short notice. 2 This friction can cause the ex post allocation of funds to be suboptimal. Third, our model posits contractual imperfections, due to limited liquidity and moral hazard, in the relationships between matched entrepreneurs and lenders. Available liquidity in a given period is limited to the flow of funds to the lender plus currently-produced output.
Payments to entrepreneurs cannot exceed this sum. Further, entrepreneurs must exert effort to produce output and to maintain their relationships with lenders. In this contracting environment, the liquidity constraint binds when a lender receives a small flow of funds. The entrepreneur that is currently matched with the lender cannot then be given the incentive to exert high effort, and the relationship breaks up. Thus, the combination of liquidity constraints and moral hazard makes the relationship fragile in the face of fluctuations in available funds. It follows that the lender's short run access to liquidity determines whether the relationship can be sustained in the face of contracting problems.
The number of relationships (lender-entrepreneur matches) is an important state variable in this economy, since it affects the efficiency of financial intermediation and the returns that households can earn on investment. The interaction between the number of relationships and household investment gives rise to multiple Pareto-ranked steady-state equilibria, where positive-activity steady states coexist with a zero-activity "collapse" steady state. Multiple equilibria emerge from complementarity between intermediation and investment. As the number of relationships rises, intermediation operates more effectively, and the rate of return on investment increases. The higher rate of return induces households to provide more funds in the aggregate, thereby allowing more relationships to be sustained. Aggregate increasing returns therefore emerge from the process of allocating invested funds via longterm relationships. For a range of values of aggregate investment, this effect dominates the usual decreasing-returns effect arising from the production function.
Feedbacks between financial intermediation and investment serve as a mechanism for propagating aggregate shocks. When an exogenous shock severs a proportion of the relationships, damage is persistent because reforming relationships takes time. In addition, destruction of relationships causes aggregate investment to fall, due to less efficient intermediation and a consequent decline in investment returns. This, in turn, leads even more relationships to break up, inducing further reductions in aggregate investment. In this way, the intermediation-investment complementarity propagates the shock.
If a shock destroys sufficiently many relationships, then the formation of new relationships can be too slow to offset the ongoing destruction of existing relationships caused by low investment. In this economic condition, the collapse state becomes the unique equilibrium.
Here collapse is not induced by a sunspot; rather, it becomes unavoidable when the number of lender-entrepreneur relationships is too low to support adequate investment incentives.
Our theory sheds light on processes that underlie phenomena such as financial collapses and credit crunches. Outflows of liquidity can damage financial structure by breaking up credit market relationships, thereby generating further outflows. Timely injections of resources by a policy authority can stave off financial damage, and may prevent the economy from collapsing.
The results developed here relate to the large literature on "coordination failure," pioneered by Bryant (1983) and Cooper and John (1988) , that stresses the possibility of low-activity steady states sustained by macroeconomic complementaries. We contribute to this literature by proposing a novel source of complementaries stemming from frictions associated with credit relationships. Since the number of relationships can adjust only gradually, our approach to coordination failure offers added insights with respect to macroeconomic dynamics. Importantly, in our model, the low-activity steady state may arise as the unique equilibrium following a large shock, rather than as one of several equilibria that are conditioned on a sunspot.
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The liquidity-flows approach to credit market frictions, which focusses on external finance, represents an alternative to established "internal equity" models of credit frictions that highlight contracting problems created by limited entrepreneurial wealth. 4 Both the liquidity-flows and internal-equity approaches provide mechanisms for propagating macroeconomic shocks, and they can be viewed as complementary perspectives. The liquidity flows model offers additional predictions pertaining to aggregate increasing returns and multiple steady states. 5 Several other papers have considered how lender wealth constraints contribute to credit market frictions. Using static models with adverse selection, Farmer (1988a Farmer ( ,1988b shows that limited access to liquidity can affect the efficiency of contracting and the extent of factor utilization. Diamond (1984) and Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997a) present microeconomic 3 Cooper and Corbae (1997) propose a model of financial collapse based on coordination failure in financial intermediation. In their paper, households must simultaneously commit to payments in order to finance the fixed costs of intermediation, and collapse occurs when households believe that other households will not contribute. Periodic collapse outcomes are tied to a sunspot process. 4 Internal equity models based on the costly state verification framework of Townsend (1979) have been considered by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) , and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) . To obtain quantitatively important results, these models rely on specifying very high levels of audit costs. Kiyotake and Moore (1997) develop a model in which borrower collateral constitutes a binding constraint on loans, because borrowers are able to "take the money and run." As pointed out by Berger and Udell (1995) , however, only about half of all lines of credit are secured. 5 For simplicity, our model assumes that entrepreneurs do not make use of private wealth for production or contracting. Our analysis can, thus, also be applied to cases in which the entrepreneur's wealth is small relative to the size of the firm.
models that link financial intermediation to the lender's wealth position. There have been a number of previous theoretical models of long-term relationships in credit markets; see Freixas and Rochet (1997, chapter 4) . These models have focussed on properties of the contract between borrower and lender. 6 Our analysis draws on formal methods used in the labor literature, particularly Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Ramey and Watson (1997) . The modelling of liquidity allocation to lenders is closely connected to the case of "costly capital adjustment" considered in den
Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) , where the level of a capital input must be chosen before a relevant shock is realized. For both liquidity allocation and costly capital adjustment, the key idea is that inputs cannot adjust costlessly.
Finally, Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997b) have considered a model in which low entrepreneurial collateral can lead to termination of projects. In their model, financial intermediaries transfer wealth between entrepreneurs in order to avoid terminations, and aggregate liquidity can be insufficient when entrepreneurs' wealth is highly correlated. Our model, in contrast, considers external finance rather than collateral, and shows that insufficiency of aggregate liquidity can be brought on by damage to financial structure.
Section 2 presents the model and describes the three key frictions incorporated into the model. Section 3 lays out the equilibrium conditions. Multiple steady-state equilibria are derived in Section 4, and propagation of shocks is considered in Section 5. In Section 6, we highlight the role of allocation frictions; we show that such frictions are critical to the existence of a collapse steady state. Section 7 concludes.
Model
We consider an economy in which there is a single good that may be used for consumption, investment, and contracting. The agents in this economy are: (i) a representative household;
(ii) a unit mass of intermediaries (whom we call lenders); and (iii) a potentially infinite mass of entrepreneurs. The agents interact over an infinite number of discrete periods. In each 6 Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (1998) have recently developed a matching model of bank lending, considering how matching frictions and breakup costs affect dynamic responses to short-term interest rate shocks.
period, the household makes a consumption/savings decision, whereby "savings" constitute the quantity of the good supplied to the financial intermediaries. The return on savings depends on the number of lender-entrepreneur matches and on the process whereby savings are allocated to lenders.
The lenders form bilateral, long-term relationships with entrepreneurs on a matching market. Entrepreneurs must pay a fixed posting cost to enter the matching market in a given period. A lender can only allocate funds received from the household to an entrepreneur with whom it is currently matched. Thus, an unmatched lender has no outlet for its funds.
In an entrepreneur-lender match, the entrepreneur uses the lender's funds as a productive input. Production also requires the entrepreneur to exert effort, which is contractible. Contracting in a given period is resolved according to fixed bargaining weights (as with the Nash Bargaining Solution). The lender's gross proceeds are returned to the household at the end of the period. Further, the lender-entrepreneur relationship is severed if the entrepreneur exerts low effort in the period; in this case, or if the relationship is severed by agreement, the agents return to the matching market to find new partners.
Thus, we consider the following three frictions:
• Matching Friction. In a given period, the probability that an unmatched lender or entrepreneur finds a partner is less than one. Moreover, entrepreneurs incur a positive cost of searching for lenders.
• Allocation Friction. Resources saved by the household are not optimally allocated among lenders.
• Contractual Imperfections. Entrepreneur-lender relationships function under limited liquidity and moral hazard.
The following three subsections describe the model, and the three frictions, in more detail.
Subsection 2.4 provides empirical motivation for the matching and allocation frictions.
2.1. Allocation of Funds. Let H t denote the aggregate quantity of the good that the household saves at the end of period t − 1, which is made available for investment at the start of period t. For simplicity, we assume that the household maximizes the expected present value of consumption, where r is the discount rate. Let β ≡ 1/(1 + r) denote the implied discount factor. The household is endowed with a quantity of the good in each period. We assume throughout that the endowment is sufficiently large to make aggregate resource constraints nonbinding.
The household is not able to invest in a spot asset market. Rather, investment must flow through the lenders, who operate on behalf of the household. Let h t denote the quantity of invested funds received by a particular lender at the start of period t. The allocation of funds to lenders is subject to random shocks. For this analysis, we abstract from details of the asset-allocation process, and assume simply that h t is determined by a reduced-form liquidity allocation rule. In our benchmark specification, all lenders (matched and unmatched) have equal access ex ante to funds; each lender's allocation h t is drawn according to the distribution function ν(h t |H t ), assumed to be continuous and increasing in H t according to first-order stochastic dominance. Assume also that h t = 0 is contained in the support of ν(h t |H t ). Further, total liquidity allocations are equal to the aggregate level:
The benchmark allocation rule features two forms of friction, each of which reduces the efficiency of liquidity allocation and distorts household investment returns: (i) unmatched lenders get funds, but these lenders cannot offer positive net returns; and (ii) among matched lenders, allocations may not yield the optimal distribution of funds ex post. In Section 6, we show that our results are robust to eliminating friction (i), i.e., funds are allocated only to matched lenders. The results are sensitive, however, to the elimination of both frictions. 7 More generally, the liquidity allocation rule could specify that total allocations are less than aggregate liquidity, reflecting resource costs of allocation. Our results continue to hold in the latter case. The probability that an unmatched lender identifies a promoting entrepreneur in a given period depends on the scarcity of new projects relative to the total number of unmatched lenders. Let U t denote the mass of unmatched lenders at the start of period t, and let
A given unmatched lender identifies a new project in period t with probability λ(θ t ), which is continuous, strictly increasing, and satisfies λ(0) = 0. When a new project is identified, the lender and entrepreneur begin a relationship in the following period. The aggregate flow of new projects in a period is given by U t λ(θ t ). The probability that a promoting entrepreneur is matched with a lender, λ(θ t )/θ t , is assumed to be strictly decreasing in θ t , and satisfies lim θt→0 λ(θ t )/θ t = 1 and lim θt→∞ λ(θ t )/θ t = 0.
2.3. Lender-Entrepreneur Contracting. Lenders and entrepreneurs in continuing relationships negotiate contracts and engage in production in each period. Production requires both invested funds and effort by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial effort is also necessary for maintenance of the project. We suppose that effort may be either high or low. If the liquidity allocation is h t and the entrepreneur chooses high effort, then output produced in the period is given by f (h t ). Assume that f (h t ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies
The choice of high effort further implies that the project is maintained, and the relationship continues into the following period.
If low effort is chosen, then zero output is produced, and instead the entrepreneur obtains a private effort benefit of x > 0. Moreover, low effort causes the project to fail, and the relationship is severed. In this case, it is assumed that the lender cannot be rematched with a new entrepreneur until the following period.
The assumption that low effort induces severance of the relationship can be motivated in a number of ways. To the extent that cooperation is sustained by reputation, a low effort choice may destroy prospects for future cooperation if renegotiation between the entrepreneur and lender is costly. Further, even where the agents may renegotiate costlessly, low effort may give rise to dispute resolution costs that make it too costly to try to preserve the relationship; see Ramey and Watson (2002) . Low effort could also induce a "breakdown" of productivity that causes the project to produce zero output for some number of periods, giving the agents an incentive to sever the relationship. 8 At the start of the period, the lender and entrepreneur observe the current-period realization of h t , and following this they negotiate a contract that determines the division of joint surplus, along with the entrepreneur's effort choice. Total contractible wealth for the period consists of the liquidity allocation plus any output produced. In particular, for simplicity we assume that the entrepreneur does not have private assets that can be transferred as part of the contract. The lender is assumed to appropriate the liquidity allocation and output, and the contract specifies payments to the entrepreneur conditional on his effort choice. Contract negotiation consists of a first and final offer by the lender, which the entrepreneur may either accept or reject. If the entrepreneur rejects the offer, then the relationship is severed, and the lender becomes unmatched. The lender may also opt to sever the relationship in lieu of making an offer. In either of these cases, the lender may be rematched in the current period.
In equilibrium, the contract will determine a threshold value of h t such that the entrepreneur chooses low effort, and the relationship breaks up, if and only if h t lies below the threshold. Letting h t ≥ 0 denote this threshold, the expected value of output, conditional on H t , is given by:
Assume that µ(0|H t )/H t is strictly decreasing in H t . Thus, aggregate returns to scale are 8 As an alternative to severence of relationships, it can be assumed that low effort leads to persistent productivity breakdown. Under this assumption, λ can be specified as the (constant) probability of productivity recovery. It is straightforward to rework the model and extend the results to this case.
diminishing if h t = 0, i.e., if high effort is always chosen. Our assumptions on f imply that lim Ht→0 µ(0|H t )/H t = ∞ and lim Ht→∞ µ(0|H t )/H t = 0.
Empirical Motivation for Credit Market Frictions.
In this section, we provide motivation for the matching and allocation frictions specified in our model. Udell (1995) show that an additional ten years of bank-borrower relationship lowers the loan premium by 48 basis points, and lowers the probability of collateral being pledged by about 16 percentage points. Finally, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that loan rates are smaller for 9 The assumptions of limited liability and moral hazard are standard in the literature, and we refer the reader to Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) for a discussion of these frictions in credit market transactions.
firms that borrow from only one bank. Indirect evidence for the importance of credit market relationships is provided by Hoshi, Kashyap, Scharfstein (1990, 1993), Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993), Gibson (1995) , and Peek and Rosengren (2000), who demonstrate links between borrowers and the financial health of their banks. Prowse (1998) discusses the importance of relationship lending for the private equity markets. 10 Motivation for allocation friction. Our framework assumes that random factors influence the allocation of funds across lenders, and that it is costly for lenders to obtain additional sources of funds at short notice. As a consequence, the realized distribution of funds might be suboptimal given the needs of different lenders. This subsection offers empirical examples documenting the importance of such frictions.
The market for commercial and industrial (C&I) bank loans exemplifies the importance of allocation frictions. In this market, the quantity of bank loans issued is constrained by the amount of bank equity. 11 Importantly, bank equity depends in a large part on past successes and failures, and obtaining additional bank equity is costly, especially in times of distress.
Since banks often specialize in particular sectors and regions, their loan portfolios are often not well diversified, which means that banks' equity positions can display large variations.
The importance of these effects became clear during the banking crises in the mid 1980's in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, caused by falling agriculture and energy prices, and during the banking crises in the early 1990's in New England tied to falling real estate prices. 12 The effect of bank equity on loans has received a great deal of attention in the literature. 13 Recent empirical work by Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) and Peek and Rosengren (1997) , which addresses the problem of endogeneity of loan demand, documents that bank loans are sensitive to internally-generated additions to capital. Negative shocks to capital therefore limit a bank's ability to provide its customers with funds. 14 The private equity market, discussed by Prowse (1998) , gives a second example in which allocation frictions are important. Intermediaries in the private equity market, called limited partnerships, identify wealthy investors (for example, institutional investors) who are willing to provide equity finance to one of the intermediary's corporate clients. Typically, the investor requires the limited partnership to also invest in the firm. But since a recent string of bad outcomes will affect the amount of funds the intermediary can advance, it will also affect, to some extent randomly, the amount of funds that the intermediary can channel to its client.
Equilibrium

Equilibrium Contract and Breakup Margin.
The equilibrium contract in a continuing relationship is derived as follows. Let p t denote the payment to the entrepreneur if high effort is chosen. Clearly, the equilibrium contract will specify that the entrepreneur receives nothing if low effort is chosen, since negative payments are not possible. The 13 This literature is surveyed by Sharpe (1995).
14 A bank could in principle obtain funds by selling C&I loans to other banks, so that the loans would not be counted against its equity. This mechanism does not appear to counteract the constraining effect of bank equity in practice, however. Although the market for C&I loans has expanded, it is not as well developed as is the secondary market for real estate loans, since C&I loans are less standardized. Moreover, the market for C&I loan sales is dominated by the very large banks: Demsetz (1993) documents that only two sellers account for an average of 42% of aggregate sales between the first quarter of 1986 and the first quarter of 1992. We mention above that the financial health of a bank affects that of its customers. All of this suggests that, at least for banks in distress, selling C&I loans does not provide a ready source of relief.
entrepreneur selects high effort if and only if
where g e t indicates the present value of the entrepreneur's expected future payments if the relationship continues. Note that the entrepreneur obtains a future return of zero if the relationship breaks up, since potential entrepreneurs dissipate all the rents from promoting new projects. Thus, the right-hand side of (2) reflects only current-period private benefit of low effort.
In negotiating a contract that induces high effort, the lender will offer the smallest value of p t that satisfies (2) . Moreover, p t must be nonnegative, since the entrepreneur has no assets. Thus, p t is given by
The contract is further constrained by the available contractible wealth; i.e., the lender cannot draw on the future value of the relationship to make current payments to the entrepreneur. This means that the following liquidity constraint must be satisfied:
We next consider whether the lender and entrepreneur benefit from continuing the relationship. The lender prefers to offer a contract that induces high effort, as opposed to severing the relationship at the start of the period, if and only if the following condition holds:
where g t indicates the present value of expected future joint returns from continuing the relationship, and w t denotes the present value of the lender's expected future returns from entering the pool of unmatched lenders in period t; both terms are net of future liquidity allocations. The left hand side of (5) constitutes the share received by the lender, consisting of the the joint returns, f (h t ) + g t less current and future payments to the entrepreneur.
Further, the lender will not prefer a contract that induces low effort. Such a contract would give the lender a current-period net return of zero, while the present value of expected future returns would be βw t+1 , based on commencing search for a new entrepreneur at the start of the next period. In any equilibrium with positive matching probabilities, this is less than the return of w t that the lender obtains from breaking up the relationship at the start of the period. Thus, the lender prefers to continue the relationship if and only if (5) holds.
Condition (2) implies that the entrepreneur always prefers to continue the relationship as long as the contract induces high effort.
In summary, the relationship continues into the next period if and only if (4) and (5) hold, where p t is given by (3). If either (4) or (5) are violated, then the relationship breaks up at the start of the period.
Observe that both constraints (4) and (5) become weaker as h t is increased: f (h t ) is an increasing function of h t ; and, conditional on the path of aggregate investment, the future values g t , g e t and w t are independent of h t . Thus, there exists a breakup margin h t having the property that the relationship continues if h t ≥ h t , and breaks up if h t < h t . Combining (3), (4) and (5), it follows that the the following expression determines the breakup margin:
3.2. Future Returns. The present value of expected future joint returns, g t , is determined by
Observe that (7) defines joint returns as a weighted combination of the benefits of continuing the relationship and the benefits received when the relationship breaks up.
The present value of the entrepreneur's expected future returns, g e t , satisfies 15 In this model, relationships break up because available funds are low. Alternatively, liquidity problems could be triggered by unexpectedly high random fixed costs, as in Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997b) . The key idea is that lenders face costs to obtain additional funds on short notice.
As for the present value of the lender's expected future returns from entering the pool of unmatched lenders, w t , we have
The following lemma derives a constraint on the entrepreneur's future value that greatly simplifies the analysis of equilibria.
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Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, g e t ≤ βx for every t.
The lemma is a consequence of the fact that the entrepreneur's current payment would be zero if his future returns exceeded x in any period.
3.3. Matching. Let N t denote the mass of lenders who enter period t in continuing relationships. The mass of lenders who seek new projects in period t , U t , may be expressed
The first term on the right-hand side of (10) indicates lenders who enter the current period unmatched, while the second term captures lenders whose relationships have broken up at the start of the current period.
The ratio of new projects to unmatched lenders, θ t , is determined by the following rent dissipation condition:
It is possible to satisfy (11) if c/g e t ≤ 1; otherwise, θ t = 0 holds. The law of motion for the mass of lenders in continuing relationships is given by
where the first term on the right-hand side captures surviving relationships from the preceding period, and the second term reflects newly-formed relationships. 16 The proof of this lemma and the other proofs are given in the appendix.
3.4. Aggregate Investment. Let R t denote the one-period aggregate net rate of return on investment:
where p t is determined by (3) and H t > 0. For H t = 0, the aggregate net return is defined as the limit of (13) as H t → 0. The representative household demands a rate of return of r.
Thus, H t gives equilibrium aggregate investment if
Additionally, if R t < r at H t = 0, then H t = 0 gives an equilibrium value.
To summarize, given an initial number of relationships N 1 , equations (6)- (14) jointly determine h t , g t , g e t , w t , U t , θ t , N t+1 , R t and H t for t = 1, 2, ... .
Multiple Steady States
In this section we demonstrate that the model possesses multiple steady-state equilibria (SSE), associated with differing levels of aggregate activity. Making use of Lemma 1, steadystate versions of equilibrium conditions (6)-(12) may be written as follows:
)
Finally, the steady-state aggregate net return may be written:
Equilibrium aggregate investment satisfies the following:
Either R = r, or H = 0 and R < r.
We now state conditions under which there exists a SSE with H > 0, meaning that there is productive activity in the economy. The household is willing to choose positive aggregate investment only if it earns a sufficiently high return. From (22) , it may be seen that the return depends on the size of payments to the entrepreneur: the return may be too low if
x − g e is too high. Since payments to the entrepreneur are based on x, it follows that small x is needed to sustain a SSE with H > 0. According to (17) , however, potential entrepreneurs have little incentive to promote new projects when x is low. As a consequence, for given values of x, we must specify values of c that are sufficiently low to support θ > 0, and thus
It follows that low values of x must be accompanied by sufficiently low values of c in order to ensure that θ > 0. The following proposition uses a tractable condition on c that is sufficient for this.
Proposition 1.
Choose any ω ∈ (0, 1), and let c be given by c = ωβx. If x is sufficiently small, then there exists a SSE with H > 0.
The proof makes use of the fact that when x = 0, there exists a unique SSE, having strictly positive aggregate investment. The proof constructs an equilibrium that is a perturbation of this SSE. The assumption c = ωβx is used to rule out the possibility that N collapses to zero when x is small.
In the positive-activity equilibrium of Proposition 1, h > 0 will hold as a consequence of x > 0, and thus there is a positive probability that a low liquidity allocation will cause a given continuing relationship to break up in any period. Contracting problems, in the form of liquidity constraints combined with entrepreneurial moral hazard, cause credit market relationships to be fragile in the face of fluctuations in available liquidity. This financial fragility is manifested in the positive failure rate of established relationships, offset in equilibrium by the initiation of new projects.
When x is strictly positive, there will also exist a SSE in which H = 0, meaning that all economic activity ceases. The following proposition establishes the existence of this "collapse" equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If x > 0 then there exists a SSE with H = 0.
In the collapse equilibrium of Proposition 2, entrepreneurs have no incentive to promote new projects, since no funds are available. As relationships are not created, the household obtains a zero return on any funds given to the lenders, and so nothing is invested. The key credit market imperfection in this case is that the household cannot channel funds directly to new entrepreneurs; rather, funds must flow through lenders, subject to allocation frictions.
Propositions 1 and 2 together imply that the model possesses multiple SSEs for small
positive values of x: a positive-activity equilibrium coexists with the collapse equilibrium.
The existence of multiple equilibria reflects complementarity between the structure of finan- The relationship between aggregate investment and financial intermediation is illustrated in Figure 1 . For convenience, the example uses a liquidity allocation rule having a two-point support, with one of the points being h t = 0. 17 The figure reports the values of the number of 17 For the examples, the support of ν(h t |H) is taken to consist of 0 and h
Although our specification does not satisfy the assumption that ν(h t |H) should be continuous, the discrepency is inessential, since we can regard the specification as approximating a continuous distribution function that increases sharply at h = 0 and h = h u (H). The production function is given by f (h t ) = h α t and the matching function by m(U t , V t ) = ξU values of ν(h|H) lying below unity. In this case, an increase in H leads to a larger number of relationships, a higher matching probability, and a lower breakup probability. Finally, for a middle range of H, positive-valued solutions coexist with zero-valued solutions. 18 used in earlier drafts of this paper. In the extension of Section 6, however, we need this slight modification to satisfy the sufficiency conditions. In order to compare the results for different environments, we use the modified allocation rule in this section as well. 18 For these middle values of H, a value of g e equal to zero implies that relationships break up even at h = h u (H), and so g e indeed equals zero. At the same time, assuming that no breakup takes place at h = h u (H) implies a value for g e such that in fact no break up occurs at h = h u (H). This accounts for the coexistence of zero and positive solutions. Below we will select the positive steady states in cases where The solid line in Figure 2 plots the values of the average return, R, associated with the solutions in Figure 1 ; average returns are derived using (22) . The figure illustrates the existence of multiple SSE. The region of low H for which R = 0 may be noted; the origin indicates the collapse equilibrium derived in Proposition 2. For a middle region of H, average returns rise with H, as the favorable effect of higher liquidity on the number of continuing relationships outweighs the effect of diminishing returns within individual relationships. Complementarity between H and N thus generates aggregate increasing returns on this region. For high H, diminishing returns come to dominate. These conflicting effects give rise to a pair of equilibria with positive H. Returns for the x = 0 economy, in which all lenders are matched in every period, are given by the upper curve. In contrast to the fragile economy, the x = 0 economy exhibits diminishing returns for all H and has a unique steady-state equilibrium. The line labeled "only matched lenders can get funds" is discussed in Section 6. multiple solutions exist.
Propagation of Shocks
This section shows how complementarity between the structure of financial intermediation and aggregate investment helps to propagate aggregate shocks. To illustrate how shocks are propagated, we consider a shock that takes the form of a surprise reduction in the number of continuing relationships. This may be interpreted as a negative productivity shock. The economy is assumed to enter period 1 in a positive-activity SSE, with N giving the number of continuing relationships. Before the level of aggregate liquidity is determined, however, N drops to a lower level, reflecting exogenous breakup of relationships. 19 Figure 3 presents numerically calculated equilibrium values associated with a negative shock to the number of relationships, aggregate investment, and the breakup probability. 20 Observe that the number of relationships drops sharply, but returns only gradually to its SSE value; thus, the shock has a persistent effect on the structure of intermediation.
The need for lenders to gradually rematch is one source of this persistence. As documented by the graph, there is also a large and persistent decline in aggregate investment following the shock, reflecting the investment response to lower levels of N t and higher levels of ν(h t |H t ). Correspondingly, the breakup probability ν(h t |H t ) remains persistently above its steady-state level, further slowing the return of N t to the steady state.
The resulting effects on output are shown in Figure 4 , which compares output in the equilibrium (thick solid line) to the path that would emerge if H t were held fixed at its SSE level (thin solid line), so that propagation would be driven solely by lender rematching.
Observe that intermediation-investment feedbacks serve to magnify the shock on impact, and overall they roughly double the output loss in this example.
The credit market response to the shock involves two competing effects. On one hand, 19 Alternatively, one can consider an experiment where aggregate productivity is unexpectedly lower in period zero but has recovered in period one. The results of this experiment are similar, except that because of the burst of destruction in period zero, N 1 will lie below the steady state level N at the outset of period one. 20 Details are given in footnote 17. structure is repaired via matching, as relationships are reformed. On the other hand, adverse feedbacks raise the rate at which relationships break up along the adjustment path. The latter effect can dominate, so that the market becomes unable to escape the collapse outcome.
The next proposition gives conditions under which this situation can arise.
Proposition 3. If c lies sufficiently close to βx, then for N 1 sufficiently small, there is a unique equilibrium, having H t = N t+1 = 0 for all t.
The key point is that collapse of the credit market emerges as the unique equilibrium for a sufficiently large shock to the structure of financial intermediation. In contrast to the existing literature, coordination failure in this case does not entail equilibrium selection or sunspot arguments that serve to align agents' expectations. What happens instead is that a big shock does so much damage to financial structure that recovery becomes impossible.
Proposition 3 identifies a condition on the entrepreneur's project promotion cost, c, that is sufficient to ensure that the rate at which relationships are rematched is too slow to offset the ongoing increase in their destruction due to investment-intermediation feedbacks. 21 The collapse outcome becomes an absorbing state, and only a sustained exogenous injection of liquidity can restore credit market activity.
Role of Allocation Frictions
This section analyzes in more detail the role of allocation frictions in the model. The benchmark liquidity allocation rule from Section 2 embodies two kinds of frictions: (i) unmatched lenders obtain funds; and (ii) allocations to the matched lenders may yield a suboptimal distribution of funds ex post. In this section we consider the implications of eliminating these frictions. Our results continue to hold if the liquidity allocation rule gives funds only 21 It should be noted that steady-state equilibria with positive investment can exist under conditions supporting Proposition 3. In particular, assume that for given h t , ν(h t |H t ) may be made arbitrarily small by taking H t sufficiently large. Then positive-investment equilibria will exist under the conditions of the theorem as long as f (h t ) is sufficiently large for h t outside of a neighborhood of zero, i.e., for a sufficiently high level of productivity.
to matched lenders, so that friction (i) is absent. If both frictions are eliminated, however, then the collapse equilibrium need no longer be a robust outcome of the model: an allocation rule can be found such that, as long as N 1 > 0, every equilibrium acheives an efficient allocation in the limit. 22 6.1. Allocation to Matched Lenders Only. In this subsection, we describe a class of liquidity allocation rules that give funds only to matched lenders, and under which our propositions continue to hold. Let the liquidity allocation for matched lenders be determined according to the continuous distribution function ν(h t |H t , N t ) which is now conditioned on the number of matched lenders as well as on aggregate liquidity. Unmatched lenders receive no funds. For fixed H t , ν(h t |H t , N t ) is assumed to be decreasing in N t according to firstorder stochastic dominance, reflecting the need to spread the given quantity of aggregate investment over a greater number of matched firms. The expected value of production, given the breakup margin h t and conditional on H t and N t , is defined by:
For fixed N t , the functions ν(h t |H t , N t ) and µ(0|H t , N t ) are taken to satisfy the earlier assumptions. In particular, total allocations are restricted as follows:
Further, the following is assumed to hold for each y and z satisfying 0 < y < z:
Thus, individual allocations in intermediate ranges of total allocations become unlikely when H t and N t are low. The key friction here is that the financial system becomes unbalanced between small and large lenders when the scale of intermediation is small.
The proofs of Propositions 1 through 3 extend readily to this alternative specification of the allocation rule. Positive-investment equilibria with low H t cannot be sustained when N t 22 Inefficiencies due to contracting frictions would remain, given that x > 0. See note 26 below.
is small, because matched lenders obtain either very low allocations, insufficient to sustain their relationships with entrepreneurs, or very high allocations, making them inefficiently large. The resulting distribution of funds yields an aggregate return that is insufficient to induce the household to invest. 23 In Figure 2 , the dashed line depicts the average return R as a function of H for an example that satisfies the assumptions of this subsection. 24 Aggregate increasing returns and multiple steady states, including a collapse equilibrium, continue to exist even when all funds go to matched lenders. For this case, Figure 4 plots the effects of a negative aggregate shock on equilibrium output (thick dashed line) and on the path that would emerge if H t would be held constant (thin dashed line). As demonstrated by the figure, propagation of the aggregate shock is qualitatively similar to the benchmark. This case behaves similarly to the benchmark because, in each period, a proportion of matched lenders obtains insufficient liquidity to maintain relationships with entrepreneurs. These unlucky lenders sever their relationships and yield zero net returns, as would unmatched lenders who obtain funds in our benchmark setting. 25 6.2. Balanced Allocations. What underlies the collapse outcome is that when aggregate investment and the number of relationships are low, relatively few matched lenders receive allocations that both sustain incentives and generate adequate returns. If the allocation rule could better discriminate among subsets of lenders, giving some lenders moderate proportions of available funds and others zero funds, then it would become possible to preserve a small number of relationships in the face of low aggregate investment. Such balanced allocation rules make it possible to avoid the collapse outcome and bring about an optimal 23 It can be shown that under our assumptions, (24) holds uniformly in H t as N t → 0. Thus, small N t will suffice to rule out positive-investment equilibria at all levels of H t , as needed for the proof of Proposition 3. 24 The allocation rule is identical as the one given in footnote 17, but now h u ≡ (H/N )/ν(h u |H). 25 Although the effects in the figures appear quantitatively smaller under the new rule, it is important to note that we did not recalibrate the parameters. For example, steady-state breakup levels are lower for the economy in which only matched lenders obtain funds.
distribution of funds in the SSE.
Consider the following nonrandom allocation rule. If H t ≥ (1−β)xN t , then each matched lender receives h t = H t /N t . If H t ≤ (1−β)xN t , then the allocation h t = (1−β)x is given to a subset of matched lenders having mass H t /(1−β)x, and the remaining lenders obtain h t = 0.
Further, in the latter case the allocation rule gives priority to continuing matches over newlyformed matches. That is, if H t ≥ (1 − β)xN 0 t , where N 0 t ≤ N t is the mass of relationships that continue from the previous period, then each of these continuing relationships receives a positive allocation. Observe that this rule violates (24) , since the average value of h t /H t is unity for all H t ≤ (1 − β)xN t . Note that as H t approaches zero, the allocations are balanced among a vanishingly small number of firms.
Under this balanced allocation rule, lender-entrepreneur matches are able to continue indefinitely as long as p t ≥ (1 − β)x for all t, which is indeed the case given the rule and the assumption that x is sufficiently small. Thus, as long as the effort cost for promoting new projects is sufficiently low relative to x, the number of matches can only grow over time. To state this formally, we have: Proposition 4. If c < βx and x is sufficiently small, then there is a liquidity allocation rule that violates (24) such that, for any N 1 > 0, every equilibrium has N t → 1 over time.
In the unique SSE of this economy, all lenders are matched with entrepreneurs. In view of the strict concavity of the production function f , it is efficient to give the same level of h t to each lender, and so the distribution of funds in the steady-state equilibrium is optimal. 26 Real-world implementation of such an allocation rule, however, would clearly place heavy demands on the informational and contractual capabilities of the financial sector. Frictions in allocating liquidity, modelled here in terms of randomness and unevenness of allocations 26 Aggregate investment is inefficiently low in the SSE, however, since contracting frictions imply that entrepreneurs must earn positive surplus in order to provide incentives for high effort. The balanced allocation rule achieves the most efficient allocation of aggregate investment across lenders given this incentive constraint.
across lenders, reflect plausible limitations on these capabilities, and have important implications for the functioning of the capital market.
Conclusion
Long-term relationships between borrowers and lenders are a common feature of credit market trading. This paper considers a model wherein relationships constitute channels through which invested funds flow from households to entrepreneurs. Relationships become liquidity constrained when lenders receive low flows, causing them to break up. As the number of relationships falls, financial intermediation becomes less efficient, and the returns earned by households decline. Thus, financial intermediation and investment are complementary in the aggregate. Because of this complementarity, multiple steady-state equilibria may exist, including a low activity "collapse" outcome. For a sufficiently large shock to financial structure, collapse becomes the unique equilibrium.
Our results have implications for policy responses to financial crises. Importantly, outflows of capital associated with crises may cause lasting damage to financial structure, inhibiting any subsequent inflows by making investment less attractive. These feedbacks to financial structure make for slower recovery from crisis episodes, and may drive economies into persistent low-activity states. Policy authorities can potentially prevent financial damage through interventions designed to support aggregate investment or sustain credit market relationships. Such interventions are motivated by the need to preserve valuable channels through which external investment may flow back into the economy. Policy delays can be costly in this context, since damage continues as long as aggregate investment remains low.
The model relies on a number of simplifying assumptions that make the analysis tractable, but that are not essential for our main conclusions. The process of liquidity allocation, in particular, could be analyzed in greater detail. Households may invest effort in directing asset flows toward more favorable lenders, for example. Lenders may attempt to swap liquidity after observing their allocations and their success at locating new projects. The key assumption, however, is that such processes do not eliminate all allocation errors. As the structure of intermediation weakens, errors rise, leading to lower returns and reduced investment, thereby weakening structure further. Thus, the fundamental complementarity driving the results is robust to allowing for richer liquidity allocation structures.
The assumption that entrepreneurs do not use personal wealth for investment or contracting may also be weakened without undermining the main results. In such an extended model, internal and external finance would combine to determine the breakup margin. High reliance on internal finance can be viewed as a mechanism for insuring against the fragility problems that we highlight.
>From the standpoint of modern economies like the U.S., the importance of the frictions highlighted in this paper depends on the particular financial market considered, and also on the period in question, since financial institutions have gone through remarkable changes. Another important development has been the recent consolidation in the banking sector, resulting in fewer banks and the emergence of very large banks. This may improve the efficiency of allocation, if the internal allocation of funds within big banks is efficient. Some authors, however, have pointed out that large banks might be less interested in C&I loans to small firms, 27 aggravating the matching friction, while the loss of personal relationships between entrepreneurs and owners or presidents of regional banks might worsen moral hazard problems. Finally, in the recently developed markets for private equity, as well as the markets for venture equity and trade credit, one can expect allocation frictions to remain relevant. 27 Drabenstott and Meeker (1997) point out: "When rural banks are acquired by metropolitan banks, some customers find the acquired bank is no longer interested in serving small local businesses".
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Assessing more completely the empirical significance of allocation frictions is an important topic for future research.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. From (3), we see that the most an entrepreneur can obtain in any single period is x. Thus, g
Suppose there is a contingency (including realizations of h t and other variables describing the economy) under which g e t > α, for some α > βx. From (8) it follows that there must be a contingency in this relationship, occurring with positive probability, for which p t+1 + g Proof of Proposition 1. Equations (17), (19) , (20), (21) and c = ωβx may be combined into the following two equations:
(25) and (26) have a unique solution (θ, N) = (θ E (h, H), N E (h, H)) that is continuous in h and H. Moreover, since ω < 1, it follows that θ E (h, H) > 0 for h sufficiently close to zero.
Now define the functions ψ
The function ψ A is obtained by substituting (16)- (18) into (15) . For ψ B , (17) , (19) and (21) are substituted into the first part of (23).
Lemma 2. Suppose h and H satisfy the following conditions:
Then there exists a SSE having equilibrium values h and H.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let g − w be given by
, and let g e and U be determined by (17) and (19), respectively. Then (27) implies (15), while (28) assures that (23) is satisfied. Using (29) it is possible to define g and w that satisfy (16) and (18) . Finally, (17) and (19) together imply (20) and (21).
Thus, (15) and (17) 
, taking x to be sufficiently small assures that the left-hand side of (30) Define the following: (
This implies, for sufficiently small x:
Moreover, continuity of the functions h L , ν L and θ E (h, H) means that (32) will hold for all H ∈ [H l , H u ] when x is small. Applying (30) and (32), it follows that for sufficiently small
. Thus, (27) is satisfied.
Finally, observe that
Under our assumptions, we have
Thus, the following is obtained when x is sufficiently small: Proof of Proposition 2. Fix x > 0 and suppose that inf H≥0 h L (H, x) = 0. Take a sequence
which contradicts the condition (30) that defines h L (H, x). Thus, inf H≥0 h L (H, x) > 0. Let
Using (22) and (1), we have, for all h ≥ h 0 and all N: Proof of Proposition 3. Applying Lemma 1 to (3) and (8), we have g e t = β(1−ν(h t |H t ))x. Thus, the following holds in any equilibrium:
Let h 0 be defined by
It follows that h 0 > 0, and also h t ≥ h 0 must hold in equilibrium.
Using (13) and (1), we have, for all N t and H t :
Let N 0 > 0 satisfy (33) . If N 1 < N 0 , then (34) implies R 1 < r for all H 1 , and thus the only value consistent with equilibrium is H 1 = 0.
Next, condition (11) may be written λ(θ t ) θ t = c β(1 − ν(h t |H t ))x .
As long as c/βx is sufficiently close to unity, we can be sure that θ t lies as close to zero as desired, so that λ(θ t ) < N 0 holds. Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose a lender-entrepreneur relationship never breaks up once it is formed. In this case, the entrepreneur's continuation value satisfies:
Further, p t = x − g e t must hold for all t, else p t > x − g e t ≥ 0 for some t, and the lender would offer a lower value of p t . Together with (35) this implies g e t = βx and p t = (1 − β)x for all t. In fact, if h t ≥ (1 − β)x is assured for all t, the lender and entrepreneur will choose to continue their relationship in every period.
With this, the aggregate net rate of return is given by
The following holds for sufficiently small x:
f ((1 − β)x) (1 − β)x − 1 > r, and we have that H t > N t (1 − β)x for all t. This means aggregate investment is sufficient to sustain existing relationships, and relationships never break up.
Finally, let θ 0 be defined by λ(θ 0 ) θ 0 βx = c.
Since g e t = βx, taking c sufficiently small ensures that θ 0 > 0, whence (11) implies θ t = θ 0 for all t. From (12) the law of motion for N t becomes N t+1 = (1 − λ(θ 0 ))N t + λ(θ 0 ), and N t → 1 is implied. Q.E.D.
